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Abstract. Since November 2018, the Department of Justice has prioritized the scheduling 
of the cases of thousands of families in immigration courts who have been labeled as 
“Family Units.” This policy requires that the cases be completed within one year of the filing 
of the Notice to Appear. Affected families are fleeing violence in their home countries, 
meaning that they may be eligible for protection in the United States. Under this policy, 
traumatized families must find an attorney, collect all the necessary evidence for their cases, 
and be prepared to argue their case in court in one-third of the time of the average 
immigration case. In the policy’s first year, less than three percent of families affected were 
granted any form of legal protection in the United States. This Article argues that the 
prioritization policy violates the Procedural Due Process rights of immigrant families. 
Immigrant families have the due process right to a full and fair hearing, and their hearings 
are neither full nor fair when rushed. The policy gives insufficient time for families to gather 
the evidence to prove their case and to recover from trauma such that they will be able to 
articulate their claims before the Immigration Judge. Prioritization of family cases should be 
abandoned as official policy and should not be used by future Administrations as a solution 
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Families who are seeking refuge in the United States are on a ticking clock like never before. 
In November 2018, the Department of Justice published a memo titled “Tracking and Expedition of 
‘Family Unit’ Cases”1 (commonly called the “FAMU Memo” or “FAMU Policy” by practitioners2), 
which requires that families’ cases be completed within one year or less.3 As a result, families who 
recently arrived in the United States must find an attorney, apply for asylum, gather the necessary 
evidence, and prepare for trial in one-third of the time—or less—of other cases.4 From September 
2018 to January 2020, over 100,000 cases were labeled as Family Unit cases.5 Of those, 44,503 cases 
were completed.6 Of the completed cases, only 1,271—less than three percent—were granted some 
form of protection from deportation.7 
The stakes could not be higher for families caught in this cycle. Families fleeing from 
Central America8 are coming to the United States to escape violence comparable to active war zones.9 
Gangs with the power of quasi-governments attack and kill those whom they see as working against 
them, including children who resist joining the gangs10 and people who report crimes to the police.11 
Many flee severe domestic and gender-based violence and a judicial system completely lacking the 
resources to protect them.12 Still others flee abuse for their sexual orientation or gender identity.13 A 
 
 1 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, TRACKING AND EXPEDITION OF “FAMILY UNIT” CASES (Nov. 16, 
2018) [hereinafter “FAMU Memo”], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1112036/download [https://perma.cc/MR93-
MFL9]. 
 2   See Jeffrey S. Chase, EOIR Creates More Obstacles for Families, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/12/13/eoirs-creates-more-obstacles-for-families 
[https://perma.cc/UP3G-QX2A]. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE RAPID DNA 
OPERATIONAL USE (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-rapiddna-june2019_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C8G2-NBE8]. This Article will abbreviate the policy to expedite family unit cases as the “FAMU Policy” or 
the “FAMU Memo.” 
 3   FAMU Memo, supra note 1, at 1. 
 4   Chase, supra note 2. 
 5   EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: “FAMILY UNIT” DATA FOR SELECT 
COURTS (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1187416/download [https://perma.cc/ZZD5-XAFL]. 
 6   Id. 
 7   Id. 
 8   While this policy is not directly targeted at one nationality, it disproportionately affects Central American families. 
See Complaint at 37 ¶ 119, Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Ctr. v. Trump, 451 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (D. Or. 2020) (No. 3:19-
CV-02051-IM), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/ecf_1_las_americas_v._trump_no._19-cv-02051-sb_d._or.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AB2S-K5UM]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICS YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 30 (2018). 
 9   War zones: Violence in Central America is similar to what MSF sees in global conflict areas, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS 
(Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/war-zones-violence-central-america-similar-what-msf-sees-global-
conflict-areas [https://perma.cc/G5RY-C46N]. 
 10   Annie Hylton and Sarah Salvadore, “They Said We Would Pay With Our Lives”, SLATE (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/08/as-central-american-gangs-target-younger-kids-more-minors-are-fleeing-to-the-u-
s.html [https://perma.cc/TM7T-MDJH]. 
 11   Steven Dudley and Héctor Silva Ávalos, MS13 Violence: Method or Madness?, INSIGHT CRIME (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/ms13-violence-method-madness [https://perma.cc/ML6W-V3GB]. 
 12   See, e.g., Cecilia Menjívar and Shannon Drysdale Walsh, The Architecture of Feminicide: The State, Inequalities, and 
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recent Human Rights Watch report shows that many people who have been deported from the 
United States to El Salvador have been killed upon their return.14 The report shows “a clear link 
between the killing or harm to the deportee upon return and the reasons they had fled El Salvador in 
the first place.”15 Fully and fairly evaluating asylum seekers’ cases could prevent similar deaths and 
harm in the future. 
The policy of expediting family unit cases in immigration court violates the due process 
rights of families. On its face, the expedition of family cases seems to promote efficiency and the 
completion of cases in a timely manner. However, this acceleration violates families’ right to be heard 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner due to the difficulty of obtaining evidence in asylum 
cases and the time necessary to build rapport with traumatized clients. All of these difficulties are 
amplified in the current chaos of the immigration court system. 
While this Article specifically examines the acceleration of families’ cases under the 
November 2018 FAMU Memo published by the Trump Administration, the problems with the 
acceleration policy are relevant beyond this Memo and beyond this Administration. Indeed, the 
Obama Administration also attempted to prioritize family cases in immigration court in an effort to 
promote efficiency in the courts.16 Because of the policy’s repeated use, prioritization of family cases 
is a strategy that will inevitably be present in policy discussions by future presidential administrations 
as policymakers grapple with how to make a dent in the immigration court backlog. For this reason, a 
focus on why prioritization and acceleration violates asylum seekers’ due process rights of asylum 
seekers goes beyond the 2020 election cycle. It is a “solution” that should not be repeated by any 
future Administration. 
The FAMU Policy goes to the heart of fairness in the court system. Many policies 
implemented since 2016 hurt immigrants and asylum seekers. The FAMU Policy must be recognized 
as one of these policies and challenged by both attorneys representing asylum seekers and attorneys 
engaged in impact litigation. The inability of families to put together a case to meaningfully explain 
why they deserve to remain in the United States is fundamentally unfair. Everyone has the right to 
present their claims in court. A policy that deprives them of that right must be challenged. 
Part I of this Article will describe what is currently happening in immigration courts. It will 
discuss the forms of relief from removal that exist for families who are affected by the acceleration 
policy and explain how a case makes its way through immigration court. Moreover, it will describe the 
flaws that existed prior to 2016 in the immigration courts and how the Trump Administration has 
exacerbated those flaws. It will also examine the expedition of family unit cases through immigration 
 
Everyday Gender Violence in Honduras, 52(2) LATIN AM. RES. REV. 221, 226-29 (2017) (noting that despite the prevalence of 
femicide and other forms of gender-based violence in Honduras, these cases rarely make it to court). 
 13   AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NO SAFE PLACE: SALVADORANS, GUATEMALANS AND HONDURANS SEEKING 
ASYLUM IN MEXICO BASED ON THEIR SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND/OR GENDER IDENTITY (2017), 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/No-Safe-Place-Briefing-ENG-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/92JC-
Y9JG]. 
 14   HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEPORTED TO DANGER: UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICIES EXPOSE 
SALVADORANS TO DEATH AND ABUSE, 27 (2020), https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/02/05/deported-danger/united-states-
deportation-policies-expose-salvadorans-death-and [https://perma.cc/DS5C-CSP4] (reporting “138 cases of 
[El Salvadorean deportees] killed between 2013 and 2019 after being deported from the United States”). 
 15   Id. at 2. 
 16   See description infra Part I.D. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol24/iss1/2
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court, including Obama-era policies and the new FAMU Policy currently in place. Part II will explain 
the due process rights that are afforded to immigrants in removal proceedings. It will illustrate the 
right to a full and fair hearing that is due all immigrants in removal proceedings and examine the test 
from Mathews v. Eldridge that is generally applied to questions of procedural due process. It will also 
describe the “no prejudice” test that predates Mathews and how the federal circuits where the policy 
has been implemented have applied the test in the context of asylum seekers in removal proceedings. 
Although case law varies across the country, due process ultimately requires a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard. Part III will then argue that, particularly in the current climate of immigration courts, the 
acceleration of families’ cases violates asylum seekers’ due process rights and prejudices their cases. It 
will describe how the acceleration of families’ cases through immigration court impairs their ability to 
collect evidence and build rapport with their attorney so they can fully present their case. These two 
issues, in turn, prevent their hearings from being meaningful as required by due process. Additionally, 
this lack of a meaningful hearing ultimately prejudices the asylum seekers, as more time would 
provide the opportunity to collect evidence and prepare to testify despite the impacts of trauma. 
Finally, Part IV will address questions and logical conclusions associated with the FAMU Policy. It 
will briefly discuss proposals for a sufficient amount of time in an asylum case. Ultimately, this 
question requires analysis beyond the question of the FAMU Policy. 
The protections of due process apply—and must be applied—regardless of whether the 
asylum seeker would ultimately win their case. Recent changes in the laws are making many asylum 
cases increasingly difficult to win.17 However, the comparative likelihood of success on the merits is 
not the focus of due process analysis. Every asylum seeker, and every family, deserves the opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, regardless of the strength of their case 
under current precedent. While accelerating a class of cases that may not appear to be strong on the 
merits is a tempting solution to the problems facing the immigration court system, it is not a fair 
solution. The problems facing the immigration court system are significant and must be solved, but 
trampling the due process rights of vulnerable families is not the answer. 
I. IMMIGRATION COURT, TRUMP, AND CASE PRIORITIZATION 
In order to understand why the FAMU Policy violates due process, it is necessary to 
understand the immigration court system and what immigrants and their attorneys face in these 
complex cases. This Part will briefly explain what the immigrants most affected by the FAMU Policy 
may apply for under current immigration law, including asylum, withholding of removal, protection 
under the Convention Against Torture, and, for some children, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. It 
will then illustrate how a case advances through immigration court, including who is present during 
the hearings, the different phases of a case, and how appeals work. Next, it will describe how the 
Trump Administration has exacerbated problems that were already latent in the immigration court 
system before 2016. Finally, this Part will recount the history of the FAMU Memo that is at issue in 
this Article. 
 
 17   See, e.g., Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) and Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 319 (A.G. 2018) 
(both discussing recent changes to law that require asylum applicants to (1) show they are members of a social group, and (2) 
that membership was the “central reason for their persecution”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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A. Relief from Removal for Recently Arrived Families 
Asylum is a crucial form of protection for anyone—including families—fleeing persecution. 
To qualify for asylum, a person must show that they are “unable or unwilling to return to, and [are] 
unable or unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of, that country because of persecution or 
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”18 Asylum applicants must demonstrate that they19 (1) 
have suffered or have a well-founded fear of suffering persecution, and (2) that the persecution is “on 
account of”20 (3) a protected ground. The definition of persecution21 as well as the contours of the 
protected grounds22 have been expanded and explained by case law in the several decades since the 
United States ratified the Refugee Convention.23 If an asylum seeker’s persecutor is a private actor, 
they will also need to demonstrate that the government of their country is “unable or unwilling” to 
protect them from their persecutor24 and that it is not feasible for them to relocate within their 
country.25 An immigrant who is granted asylum is authorized to stay in the United States without fear 
of being removed to their country, and is permitted to work, apply for their spouse and children to 
join them, and apply for lawful permanent residence (a “green card”) after one year of approval.26 
Five years after their permanent residence is approved, they are eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship.27 
Withholding of Removal is a similarly important protection. In a withholding case, an 
applicant must demonstrate that their “life or freedom would be threatened in [their] country” 
because of a protected ground.28 If an immigrant has shown that they have suffered past persecution, 
 
 18   8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2020). 
 19   This paper will use the singular they throughout to respect and include people of all gender identities, especially 
because many people seek asylum because of persecution in their countries on account of their sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, LGBTQ Asylum Seekers and Refugees Must Be Welcome Here (Jan. 28, 
2019), https://www.hrc.org/blog/lgbtq-asylum-seekers-and-refugees-must-be-welcome-here [https://perma.cc/9Q65-Y6B9]. 
 20   This is often referred to as the nexus requirement. See generally Christian Cameron, Why Do You Prosecute Me? Proving 
the Nexus Requirement for Asylum, 18 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 233 (2011). 
 21   See, e.g., Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Persecution is an extreme concept and has been 
defined as the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as 
offensive”) (internal citations omitted). 
 22   See, e.g., Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 236 (4th Cir. 2019) (discussing grounds for establishing a successful 
asylum claim); Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 130 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing establishment of nexus requirement in May 2005); 
Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying cancellation of removal in part because applicant for 
asylum did not demonstrate that gang members were acting upon their perceptions of his father’s political beliefs); Matter of 
Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 357 (BIA 1996) (granting asylum because applicant had established that she was part of a social 
group of women who opposed female genital mutilation); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985) (denying an 
application for asylum in part because the applicant had not demonstrated “it [was] his own, personal political opinion that a 
persecutor [sought] to overcome by the infliction of harm or suffering”) (emphasis added). 
 23   See Protocol: Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 2, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 24   See, e.g., Orellana v. Barr, 925 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 25   See, e.g., In re. M-Z-M-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 28, 32-33 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 26   8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2020). 
 27   Id. 
 28   8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2020). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol24/iss1/2
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there is a presumption that their life or freedom would be threatened.29 In its elements, Withholding 
of Removal is distinct from asylum in two ways. First, applicants for withholding must show that it is 
more likely than not they will suffer persecution.30 In asylum cases, this likelihood can be as low as a 
one-in-ten chance.31 Second, there is no time restriction on applying for Withholding of Removal. In 
an asylum case, by contrast, an applicant must apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the 
United States or within one year of changed circumstances.32 Withholding of Removal is also unlike 
asylum in that it must be granted if the elements are met.33 If an Immigration Judge (IJ) grants 
Withholding of Removal, an immigrant may stay in the United States and work, but there is no 
opportunity to receive lawful permanent residence or apply for family members to join the 
applicant.34 
Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) provides another form of relief 
from removal. In order to qualify for relief under CAT, an applicant must establish that it is more 
likely than not that they would be tortured if removed to the designated country of removal.35 
Torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him . . . a confession, 
punishing him for an act he . . . has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating . . . him. . . .”36 This torture must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”37 When 
determining whether an applicant merits this protection, “all evidence relevant to the possibility of 
future torture shall be considered,” including country conditions and evidence of “gross, flagrant, or 
mass violations of rights within the country.”38 Similar to Withholding of Removal, those who are 
granted protection under the Convention Against Torture may remain in the United States and 
receive work authorization, but they do not receive a path to permanent residency and can never 
petition for family members.39 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) is a form of protection for children who have been 
“abused, abandoned, or neglected by one or both parents.”40 The SIJS application process is unique 
in immigration because it combines state court proceedings and federal agency decision-making. SIJS 
 
 29   8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i) (2020). 
 30   8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(iii) (2020). 
 31   INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
 32   8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2)(B) (2020). 
 33   Id. 
 34   Id. 
 35   8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2), (4) (2020). 
 36   Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 
1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 37   8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). 
 38   In re J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. 291, 303 (B.I.A. 2002). See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). 
 39   Immigration Basics: Relief Under CAT, IMMIGR. EQUAL., 
https://immigrationequality.org/asylum/asylum-manual/immigration-basics-relief-under-cat/ [https://perma.cc/Q9ZN-
3NRV]. 
 40   I.N.A. § 101(a)(27)(J)(i); see also What is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS)?, SAFE PASSAGE PROJECT, 
https://www.safepassageproject.org/what-is-sijs-status [https://perma.cc/8QBE-9F6H]. 
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cases proceed differently through court than those cases where children are either not eligible or do 
not find an attorney to help them apply for it, so this form of relief will not be further addressed. 
B. How a Case Proceeds Through Immigration Court 
An immigrant’s removal41 proceedings begin with the Notice to Appear (NTA), the 
charging document in immigration proceedings.42 After the issuance of an NTA, the immigrant has 
their first hearing in court.43 The immigration court might be located very far away from where the 
immigrant lives because there is only one immigration court in many states.44 For example, a single 
court in Arlington serves all of Virginia, and it can take three hours or more to reach Arlington from 
the state’s rural areas. 
The first hearing in court is a Master Calendar Hearing.45 The Master Calendar Hearing is an 
opportunity to take pleadings, set briefing schedules, and schedule hearings on the merits of the case, 
known as Individual Hearings (the “trial” in immigration court).46 In the Author’s experience, Master 
Calendar Hearings are often short, and many immigrants (as many as fifty) are scheduled for the same 
time in front of a judge. As a matter of simplifying the process, some judges, including those in front 
of whom the Author has practiced, will hear from immigrants who are represented by counsel first, 
and then hear from immigrants who are appearing pro se. 
At immigration court hearings, there are several people in the courtroom. Those people 
include the immigrant (the “respondent”), their attorney (if they are lucky),47 the interpreter, the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Trial Attorney, and the IJ. In immigration court, ICE, 
a branch of the Department of Homeland Security, is the government’s representative.48 The IJ is an 
employee of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), a branch of the Department of 
 
 41   Although removal proceedings are colloquially called “deportation,” this Article will use the proper term of 
“removal” or “removal proceedings” because “deportation proceedings” refer to a specific historic form of hearings in 
immigration court. See Chapter 1: Introduction to Removal Proceedings, IMMIGR. LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., INADMISSIBILITY & 
DEPORTABILITY §§ 1.4, 1.6 (2015), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/sample-pdf/removal_defense-1st-2015-ch_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BPF9-UBA3] (explaining that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
combined the framework dividing “exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings into “removal” proceedings). 
 42   See Fact Sheet: Immigration Courts, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-
sheet-immigration-courts [https://perma.cc/4C6T-RQEV] (“A Notice to Appear (NTA) is the charging document issued by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to initiate removal proceedings”). 
 43   See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2020) (“Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before an IJ commence, when a charging 
document is filed with the Immigration Court by the Service.”); Cf. United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 359–61 (4th Cir. 
2019) (discussing the initiation of removal proceedings). 
 44   For a complete list of immigration court locations, see EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing [https://perma.cc/4ZHX-FMVW]. 
 45   Immigration Legal Resource Center Attorneys, Representing Clients at the Master Calendar, 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rep_clnts_mstr_cal_hearing-20181220.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9DB-6JJT] 
 46   Id. 
 47   See, infra, notes 55-65. 
 48   See Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), U.S. IMMIGRAT. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/opla 
[https://perma.cc/S3UH-N2T4]. 
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Justice. IJs are often hired from the ranks of ICE trial attorneys.49 In contrast, few IJs have public 
interest or academic backgrounds.50 
In this time between Master Calendar Hearings, many immigrants try to find representation 
in their hearings.51 There is no right to counsel at the government’s expense in immigration.52 If an 
immigrant cannot afford a private attorney, and there is not a nonprofit legal services provider or a 
law school clinic53 available to accept the immigrant for representation, they will be forced to 
represent themselves in court. 
Once a date is set for an immigrant’s Individual Hearing, it is the immigrant’s responsibility 
to assemble all the necessary evidence to make the case that they should not be removed from the 
United States.54 Although an asylum applicant’s testimony alone can be enough to make out a claim 
for asylum,55 other evidence is necessary to build a strong and persuasive case. Asylum applicants 
often present documents from their home country (if they can obtain them), such as medical records 
from when they were attacked, letters from witnesses who know what happened to the immigrant, 
and legal documents such as birth certificates, orders of protection, and death certificates.56 Evidence 
from the United States can also be crucial to their case, including psychological evaluations57 and 
physical evaluations58 to corroborate an immigrant’s account of persecution and torture. All of this 
evidence is also supplemented with additional research, including human rights reports, United 
Nations documents, news reports, academic articles, and expert affidavits to corroborate the claims 
 
 49   See Beth Fertig, Presiding Under Pressure, WNYC (May 21, 2019), https://www.wnyc.org/story/presiding-under-
pressure [https://perma.cc/HL2F-3SZA] (“The Justice Department had a long history before Trump of hiring ICE attorneys 
as judges because of their immigration trial experience.”). 
 50   See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in 18 IJs (May 13, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1161951/download [https://perma.cc/85UG-HD6D] (showing that of 18 
recently sworn in IJs, none had come from a nonprofit or academic job – though many had worked in the military or as 
prosecutors). 
 51   David Hausman & Jayashri Srikantiah, Time, Due Process, and Representation: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of 
Continuances in Immigration Court, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1827 (2016). 
 52   8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2020). 
 53   Law school clinics can be crucial to representing immigrants in underserved areas of the country. See, e.g., Meredith 
Hobbs, GSU Law Starts First Immigration Clinic in Georgia, LAW.COM (Sep. 26, 2020, 2:40 PM), 
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2019/08/13/gsu-law-starts-first-immigration-clinic-in-georgia/  
[https://perma.cc/B33A-B75Q]. 
 54   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (“The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to establish that he or she is a refugee 
as defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Act.”). 
 55   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (“The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof 
without corroboration”). But see In re Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1137 (B.I.A. 1998). 
 56   See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A 1996);  see also Agata Szypszak, Where in the World is Dr. 
Detchakandi? A Story of Fact Investigation, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 517, 521 (2000) (describing the difficulties of obtaining this 
evidence). 
 57   See PHR Asylum Program, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, https://phr.org/issues/asylum-and-persecution/phr-
asylum-program [https://perma.cc/EA6S-T2DS] (offering pro bono psychological evaluations of asylum seekers because the 
need is otherwise unsupported). 
 58   See, e.g., Apoorva Mittal, Inside the world of asylum forensic exams, CHICAGO READER (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/asylum-forensic-exams/Content [https://perma.cc/5675-CVFS]. 
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made by asylum applicants.59 
The Individual Hearing is the trial in immigration court. At the Individual Hearing, the 
immigrant is responsible for making the case for why they should not be removed from the country. 
Asylum applicants must testify about the details of their asylum case, which can include how they 
were assaulted for their sexual orientation or gender identity, how they were beaten and strangled by a 
spouse or partner, or how they were tortured for their religious or political beliefs. Individual 
Hearings are complex and emotional hearings where IJs must weigh all of the evidence in front of 
them to make a decision on an applicant’s decision.60 IJs often give their decisions orally at the 
conclusion of the Individual Hearing but can also issue a written decision.61 
After the Individual Hearing, either party can appeal. The first appeal goes to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA, also a part of EOIR, is a national board that hears appeals 
from across the United States. If either the government or immigrant is still unsatisfied with the result 
at the BIA, they can petition to the court of appeals in the circuit where the case originated. 
C. Problems in Immigration Courts 
Litigating in immigration court has been compared to handling “death penalty cases in a 
traffic court setting.”62 While this may seem like hyperbole, it captures the feeling that the “procedure 
is insufficient to handle the substance of the law.”63 There are several flaws inherent in the 
immigration court system, many of which have been exacerbated by the Trump Administration’s 
policies. 
1. Problems with the immigration courts pre-2016 
First, immigration courts are woefully understaffed and simply do not have enough judges 
or support staff to handle their current caseloads.64 The incredible task facing IJs was described by 
Chief Judge Walker of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals when he testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 2006: 
 
 59   See, e.g., Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 908-09 (8th Cir. 2013); In re S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 491 (BIA 1996); In 
re Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A. 1996); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2008). For more on one asylum 
seeker’s particular struggle through the immigration court system, and the personal struggles of gathering the evidence 
necessary for an asylum claim, see generally DAVID NGARURI KENNEY & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM DENIED: A REFUGEE’S 
STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN AMERICA (2008). 
 60   See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1655 (2010). 
 61   BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL 49 (2016). 
 62   Hon. Mark A. Drummond, “Death Penalty Cases in a Traffic Court Setting”: Lessons from the Front Lines of Today’s 
Immigration Courts, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-
news/practice-points/death-penalty-cases-traffic-court-setting-lessons-front-lines-immigration-courts 
[https://perma.cc/AT22-25AA]. 
 63   Jill E Family, The Procedural Fortress of US Immigration Law, 3 BIRKBECK L. REV. 177, 184 (2015). 
 64   See generally AM. IMMIGRAT. COUNCIL, EMPTY BENCHES: UNDERFUNDING OF IMMIGRATION COURTS 
UNDERMINES JUSTICE (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/empty_benches_
underfunding_of_immigration_courts_undermines_justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QBV-VVR7]. 
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I fail to see how IJs can be expected to make thorough and competent findings of 
fact and conclusions of law under these circumstances. This is especially true given 
the unique nature of immigration hearings. Aliens frequently do not speak English, 
so the IJ must work with a translator, and the IJ must go over particular testimony 
several times before he can be confident that he is getting an accurate answer from 
the alien. Hearings, particularly in asylum cases, are highly fact intensive and 
depend upon the presentation and consideration of numerous details and 
documents to determine issues of credibility and to reach factual conclusions.65  
At the time of Judge Walker’s testimony, IJs often complained of incredible rates of 
burnout, which were “higher than those experienced by prison wardens and emergency room 
physicians.”66 These rates of burnout were attributed to, among other things, “too little time per case; 
the pressure to provide immediate, detailed, oral decisions, even in complex cases, with no time to 
research the law or country conditions, no time to reflect, and no transcripts.”67 
Second, immigration law is incredibly complex, often involving difficult definitions and 
implicating international law such as the Refugee Convention and the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture. Immigration law also combines federal statutes, federal regulations, Department 
memos, decisions by administrative bodies, and circuit splits in case law. As described supra, too many 
immigrants unfortunately contest their removal in court pro se, and this complexity makes it difficult 
for those proceeding pro se to effectively present their case. This also means that attorneys who 
represent immigrants in this setting must be well-versed in these different areas of law and have 
sufficient time to research new developments and build their cases to fit with the complexity of this 
law. 
Third, in the midst of this complexity, immigrants do not have the right to an attorney at the 
government expense.68 Unfortunately, many immigrants cannot afford the exorbitant fees charged by 
immigration attorneys,69 and many non-profits are at capacity or unavailable in many regions across 
the country, particularly rural areas.70 This has forced many immigrants to proceed pro se in complex 
litigation that, in many cases, presents life-or-death consequences. This ultimately makes the system 
less efficient, as judges must take the time to explain the law to immigrants while also acting as fact 
finders. 
 
 65   Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Hon. 
John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Walker%20Testimony%20040306.pdf [https://perma.cc/96GF-CVWE]. 
 66   Legomsky, supra note 60, at 1655. 
 67   Id. 
 68   8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2020). 
 69   See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Young Immigrants Who Can’t Afford Lawyer Will Have To Go Without, Court Says, SF GATE (Jan. 
29, 2018, 5:28 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Young-immigrants-who-can-t-afford-lawyer-will-12534763.php 
[https://perma.cc/Y66P-QUP4] (explaining that providing lawyers for the 100,000-plus minors arrested at or near the border 
in a typical year would cost $276 million). 
 70   See Erwin de Leon & Robert Roach, Immigrant Legal-Aid Organizations in the United States, URB. INST. 4 (2013), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/24066/412928-Immigrant-Legal-Aid-Organizations-in-the-United-
States.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7AF-242Q] (explaining that the ratio between nonprofits that provide legal aid to 
undocumented immigrants and potential clients is considerably higher than in other nonprofit contexts). 
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Many immigration legal nonprofits are often at or near capacity to take on new cases. A 
2011 study showed that in New York City, success in immigration court was highly dependent on 
access to representation.71 Of immigrants who were unrepresented, only 13% had successful 
outcomes in their cases, while 74% of those who were represented were ultimately successful.72 This 
reality about the advantage of having representation in immigration court led to the creation of two 
programs, the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project73 and Immigrant Justice Corps,74 that 
represent families in the state of New York and across the country in various immigration matters 
and proceedings. In other parts of the country, bar associations,75 law school clinics,76 and local 
governments77 have also stepped in to ensure that immigrants are represented. Despite these efforts, 
the odds that an immigrant has legal representation vary drastically by state, ranging from 36% of 
immigrants represented in South Carolina to 85% in Hawaii.78 
All these flaws in the immigration court system combine to create the current crisis and 
backlog that the immigration court faces. The actions of the Trump Administration have only 
exacerbated this crisis, by certain means intentionally inflicted on the immigration courts and others 
having indirect effects. 
2. Trump policies that were intended to affect the immigration courts 
The Trump Administration, particularly through action by the Attorney General, has 
enacted many changes to the immigration court system. Many of these decisions were designed to 
take away discretion and independence from IJs. A few of the most notable of these decisions will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
 71   Peter L. Markowitz et al., Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 357 (2011); see also Nina Bernstein, In City of Lawyers, Many Immigrants Fighting Deportation Go It Alone, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/nyregion/13immigration.html [https://perma.cc/V598-8L63] 
(discussing a lack of pro bono and non-profit immigration attorneys compared to a well-staffed Department of Homeland 
Security). 
 72   MARKOWITZ, supra note 71, at 363-364. 
 73   New York Immigrant Family Unity Project, THE BRONX DEF’S., https://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/new-
york-immigrant-family-unity-project/ [https://perma.cc/AZM5-CE86] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
 74   Our Mission, IMMIGRANT JUST. CORPS, https://justicecorps.org/our-mission [https://perma.cc/DV3L-2YR3] (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
 75   See, e.g., GAIN’s Beginnings, GA. ASYLUM & IMMIGR. NETWORK, https://georgiaasylum.org/about-us/our-
beginnings [https://perma.cc/XDW6-MZMG] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) (discussing how the asylum program was started in 
part through the efforts of the Atlanta Bar Association). 
 76   See generally Public Interest Clinics, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/center-pro-
bono/resources/directory_of_law_school_public_interest_pro_bono_programs/definitions/pi_pi_clinics 
[https://perma.cc/VSR9-4EVP] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
 77   See Antonio Olivo, Virginia’s Largest County Could Be Next To Help Undocumented Immigrants Fight Deportation, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/fairfax-county-considers-fund-to-help-
undocumented-immigrants-fight-deportation/2019/04/10/0b1e1c30-5adb-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/YUA2-6M4F] (discussing how areas in the Washington region have allocated hundreds of thousands of 
dollars for immigrant legal assistance). 
 78   See Individuals in Immigration Court by Their Address, TRAC IMMIGR. (Feb. 2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/addressrep [https://perma.cc/BX9B-T9DJ]. 
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First, the former Attorney General made it more difficult for IJs to control their own 
dockets. Prior to a decision by Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, IJs were able to use powers such 
as administrative closure to manage their dockets.79 Administrative closure “temporarily pause[s] 
removal proceedings,” which can be a useful tool when an immigrant has another case pending or in 
other specific circumstances.80 In Castro-Tum, the Attorney General decided81 that “IJs and the BIA 
lack general authority to administratively close cases and restrict[ed] administrative closure to 
circumstances where it is explicitly provided for by regulation or settlement agreement.”82 While IJs in 
the Fourth Circuit can no longer rely on Castro-Tum,83 the decision still applies in immigration courts 
across the rest of the country. Hundreds of judges still cannot administratively close cases to help 
manage their dockets. 
Second, former Attorney General Sessions instituted case completion quotas for all IJs. As 
part of their performance reviews, IJs are required to complete 700 cases per year and be remanded in 
fewer than 15 percent of cases per year.84 The National Association of Immigration Judges decried 
these quotas, “warn[ing] that quotas could undermine judicial independence and erode due process 
rights for immigrants.”85 On average, these quotas require that IJs make a final decision—granting a 
case or issuing an order of removal—in approximately three cases every day.86 Deciding three cases 
every day is impossible in an eight-hour workday when immigration attorneys advise that Individual 
Hearings last four hours.87 
These policies directly impact the independence of IJs, depriving IJs of the tools to manage 
their dockets and take the time necessary to weigh the evidence before them. 
 
 79   See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE 
POST-CASTRO-TUM (2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/
administrative_closure_post-castro-tum.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3CC-BFJY]. 
 80   Id.; Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), overruled by Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 296-97 (4th 
Cir. 2019). 
 81   Among many powers over immigration, the Attorney General has the capacity to refer precedential immigration 
decisions to himself for review, and in rewriting these decisions, the Attorney General can rewrite immigration law to fit their 
own views. See generally AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 79. 
 82   AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 79, at 1. 
 83   See Romero, 937 F.3d at 296-97. 
 84   Victoria Neilson, DOJ Requires IJs To Meet Quotas, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/doj-requires-immigration-judges-meet-quotas [https://perma.cc/ZZ43-3XUT]. 
 85   Joel Rose, Justice Department Rolls Out Quotas For IJs, NPR (Apr. 3, 2018, 1:09 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/03/599158232/justice-department-rolls-out-quotas-for-immigration-judges 
[https://perma.cc/BKM9-T989]. 
 86   Neilson, supra note 84. 
 87   See, e.g., How Long Do Immigration Court Cases Take?, CARLOS BATARA IMMIGR. ATT’Y., 
https://www.bataraimmigrationlaw.com/questions-and-answers/index-deportation/how-long-immigration-court-cases-take 
[https://perma.cc/ST2X-FU4L] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) (explaining that Individual Hearings can take about four hours). 
This estimate is consistent with my own experiences in immigration court, where these hearings often last anywhere between 
two to four, or more, hours. 
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3. Trump policies that indirectly affected the immigration courts 
Since 2016, several other policies instituted and actions taken by the Trump Administration 
have broadly impacted immigration courts. While the full extent of their impact is still yet to be seen, 
these policies will inevitably increase the backlogs in immigration courts. 
First, the partial government shutdown in 2019 that lasted 35 days added thousands of cases 
to the immigration court backlog because they had to be rescheduled.88 During the shutdown, all IJs 
except those working detained dockets were furloughed. This “halt[ed] nearly all immigration court 
cases and put[] three in four immigration judges on furlough. Hearings on asylum cases, deportation, 
and appeals against orders of removal were delayed indefinitely, pending a ‘reset’ upon the 
government’s reopening that shuffled tens of thousands of cases to the back of the line.”89 The 
government shutdown, while not a decision taken with immigration courts in mind, had a major 
impact on the courts and will affect their caseloads for several years to come. 
Second, the Administration’s change in enforcement priorities adds to the number of people 
who will end up in immigration court proceedings. The Administration has ramped up immigration 
enforcement in a number of ways since Trump took office. The first was the President’s 2017 
executive order which made anyone without status a priority for removal.90 Additionally, the 
Administration has increased enforcement at sensitive locations such as courthouses.91 ICE arrests in 
courthouses have occurred nationwide,92 in cases where survivors of domestic violence93 and human 
trafficking94 have been among those arrested. These arrests have had a chilling effect on the courts, 
 
 88   See Kate Smith, The Shutdown is Over, but Immigration Courts Are in “Total Chaos”, CBS NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019, 5:09 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/immigration-court-government-shutdown-pushed-immigration-court-total-chaos-2019-01-
29/ [https://perma.cc/T53S-42H2] (reporting that almost 90,000 immigration hearings were canceled because of the 
shutdown). 
 89   Scott Bixby, Judges Say Trump’s Shutdown Broke Immigration System for Years, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 30, 2019 10:43 AM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/judges-say-trumps-shutdown-broke-immigration-system-for-years [https://perma.cc/W39V-
SEGC]. 
 90   Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N, COGS IN THE 
DEPORTATION MACHINE: HOW POLICY CHANGES BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAVE TOUCHED EVERY MAJOR AREA 
OF ENFORCEMENT 6 (2018), https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/75231 [https://perma.cc/XEN5-YZCC] 
(explaining how during his first month in office, President Trump and his administration established new enforcement policies 
calling for enforcement against all removable individuals). 
 91   IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT ET AL., SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR COURTS: THE IMPACT OF ICE 
COURTHOUSE OPERATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 75 (2019), https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/Safeguarding-the-Integrity-of-Our-Courts-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUE6-3DRC] (“Since the 
start of the Trump Administration, we’ve seen an outrageous 1700% increase in ICE arrests and attempted arrests in and 
around courts in New York.”). 
 92   See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREEZING OUT JUSTICE: HOW IMMIGRATION ARRESTS AT 
COURTHOUSES ARE UNDERMINING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/rep18-icecourthouse-combined-rel01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K4B-XPF8]. 
 93   Mark Joseph Stern, ICE Agents Are Using Pennsylvania’s Courthouses as a Stalking Ground. The State Supreme Court Can 
Stop Them, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/ice-agents-pennsylvania-courthouse-
arrests-domestic-violence-victims.html [https://perma.cc/JN3N-UEJ2]. 
 94   Beth Fertig, When ICE Shows Up in Human Trafficking Court, WNYC (Jun. 22, 2017), 
https://www.wnyc.org/story/when-ice-shows-court [https://perma.cc/UXW8-UYY2]. 
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deterring those in need of judicial protection from going to court.95 Furthermore, many of the people 
who are arrested in and around courthouses will be placed in immigration court proceedings, only 
adding to the caseloads of immigration courts. 
Third, the shift by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) from a services 
agency to an enforcement agency will add more cases to the backlog. USCIS is the branch of the 
Department of Homeland Security where immigrants with and without status alike apply for visas 
and other forms of immigration status, including but not limited to protections for survivors of 
crime, domestic violence, and human trafficking.96 In June 2018, USCIS announced a new policy 
under which denied cases may be followed by the issuance of an NTA, the document that begins 
removal proceedings.97 Although it is still unclear how many NTAs have been issued as a result, the 
policy is certain to add more cases to EOIR’s docket, and inevitably to the case backlog. 
D. Expedition of Family Cases in Immigration Court 
Prioritization of families’ cases is not a new policy strategy. In the summer of 2014, 
thousands of children and families crossed the southern border.98 In response, in July 2014, “Juan P. 
Osuna, the director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), announced new 
policies for children and families in deportation proceedings: the immigration courts would prioritize 
the cases of both unaccompanied children and families with children.”99 Subsequently, when 
immigrants were apprehended at the border and designated as “adults with children,” this label 
followed them to immigration court, and their cases were scheduled accordingly.100 This 
 
 95   ANGELA IRVINE ET AL., THE CHILLING EFFECT OF ICE COURTHOUSE ARRESTS: HOW IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) RAIDS DETER IMMIGRANTS FROM ATTENDING CHILD WELFARE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
ADULT CRIMINAL, AND YOUTH COURT HEARINGS (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/58ba8c479f7456dff8fb4e29/t/5dae6ba65642ea5d1cef9705/1571711914510/ice.report.final.21oct2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6R3S-39TB]. 
 96   See Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-
status/victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status [https://perma.cc/L3RS-Y6KG] (providing instructions for victims 
of human trafficking to apply for status through USCIS); see also Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (June 12, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-
crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status 
[https://perma.cc/7VUC-B7AB] (providing instructions for victims of certain crimes to apply for status through USCIS). For 
more on immigration protections for survivors of domestic violence, see generally J. Nicole Alanko, “Helpfulness” Is a Two-Way 
Street: How the Commonwealth of Virginia Can Support Undocumented Survivors of Domestic Violence, 16 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY 
L.J. 35 (2019). 
 97   AILA POLICY BRIEF: EXPANDED NTA GUIDANCE WILL HAVE DEVASTATING EFFECTS ON SURVIVORS OF 
DOMESTIC ABUSE, TRAFFICKING, AND OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES 1-2 (2018), 
https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/78262 [https://perma.cc/FGU6-DFNW]. 
 98   See Diana Villiers Negroponte, The Surge in Unaccompanied Children from Central America: A Humanitarian Crisis at Our 
Border, BROOKINGS INST. (July 2, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/07/02/the-surge-in-
unaccompanied-children-from-central-america-a-humanitarian-crisis-at-our-border [https://perma.cc/8Y2X-RJE4] (reporting 
47,017 children apprehended at the U.S./Mexico border in the first eight months of FY2014). 
 99   Hausman & Srikantiah, supra note 51, at 1824. 
 100   Id. at 1826 n.14. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
 24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2021)  
16 
 
categorization and prioritization of cases was implemented nationwide.101 IJs “were instructed to give 
expedited consideration to priority docket cases.”102 This became known as the “rocket dockets.”103 
The rocket dockets forced attorneys for children and families to scramble to come up with a 
way to respond to the overwhelming need for representation.104 Many cases that were already pending 
but did not fit into the Administration’s priorities were pushed back to November 29, 2019,105 after 
which they were then rescheduled to 2021.106 Even at the time, the acceleration of families’ cases was 
criticized as potentially violating the rights of arriving asylum seekers.107 Despite the prioritization, the 
backlog in immigration courts increased from 408,037 in 2014 to 629,051 in 2017 when President 
Trump took office.108 Because the prioritization did not produce the desired results, the policy was 
abandoned in 2017.109 
In December 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions published a memorandum for the 
EOIR to highlight the office’s policy priorities. In particular, Attorney General Sessions announced 
EOIR’s focus on “fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly administering the immigration laws.”110 This 
memo was followed by another memo from the EOIR in January 2018, which derived its authority 
from the Attorney General’s memorandum as well as the Bush-era regulations.111 This latter memo, 
however, still explicitly required that all prioritizations and acceleration of cases comport with due 
 
 101   Id. at 1824. 
 102   Id. 
 103   Kirk Semple, Advocates in New York Scramble as Child Deportation Cases Are Accelerated, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/nyregion/advocates-scramble-as-new-york-accelerates-child-deportation-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/MZD6-DNKU]. 
 104   Id. 
 105   Ballooning Wait Times for Hearing Dates in Overworked Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR. (Sept. 21, 2015), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/405 [https://perma.cc/TB4D-5PUZ]. 
 106   Bonnie Petrie, Black Friday At Immigration Court: Migrants Mistakenly Show Up For 5-Year-Old Court Date, TEXAS 
PUBLIC RADIO (November 30, 2019), https://www.tpr.org/post/black-friday-immigration-court-migrants-mistakenly-show-5-
year-old-court-date [https://perma.cc/XXZ9-RU2X]. 
 107   See generally Jayashri Srikantiah, The Immigration “Rocket Docket”: Understanding the Due Process Implications, STANFORD 
LAW SCHOOL (Aug. 15, 2014), https://law.stanford.edu/2014/08/15/the-immigration-rocket-docket-understanding-the-due-
process-implications [https://perma.cc/YE7T-6BFG] (describing how an accelerated docket may interfere with an individual’s 
right to an attorney by affording them insufficient time to obtain one). 
 108   Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog 
[https://perma.cc/VCQ4-AL95] (select “Entire US” under Fiscal Year pane and then, on the time series graph, hover over the 
column for Fiscal Year “14” and “17”). 
 109   See FAMU Memo, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that because prioritizing family unit cases did not increase EOIR’s 
case completion productivity, EOIR deprioritized them in January 2017). 
 110   Memorandum for the Executive Office for Immigration Review from the Office of the Attorney General (Dec. 5, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1041196/download [https://perma.cc/Z5GC-F7RC]. 
 111   Memorandum to the Office of the Chief IJ, All IJs, All Court Administrators, All Immigration Court Staff from 
James R. McHenry III (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1026721/download [https://perma.cc/P9P3-
TY4A] [hereinafter “Case Priorities Memo”] (citing the Office of the Attorney General memorandum and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.0(b)(1)(ii, iv)); see also Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the 
Chief IJ, 72 Fed. Reg. 53676 (Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (adding the cited provisions to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.0). 
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In November 2018, the EOIR published a memo entitled “Tracking and Expedition of 
‘Family Unit’ Cases.” As its authority, this memo cited the January 2018 memo and regulations giving 
EOIR the authority to set case priorities.113 It reprioritized the cases of families in immigration court 
who had been deemed as “family units” by Customs and Border Patrol. Unlike the Obama-era 
prioritization, this new memo required that any case determined to be a FAMU case “must be 
completed within one year or less,”114 meaning specifically that they must be completed within one 
year of the date that the NTA is filed with the court.115 This memo has thus far only applied to ten 
immigration courts across the country: Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, 
Miami, New Orleans, New York City, and San Francisco.116 However, this policy may expand to 
apply nationwide.117 
The prioritization of family cases in immigration court differs from other accelerated cases 
and statutory timelines in important respects. First, families who fall under the FAMU Policy are at a 
very different stage in their cases than families and individuals who are subject to expedited removal. 
Expedited removal “is a process by which low-level immigration officers can quickly deport certain 
noncitizens who are undocumented or have committed fraud or misrepresentation.”118 Expedited 
removal is used as a means to remove people who are caught at the southern border.119 However, 
those caught at the border are entitled to a credible fear interview (CFI) “to ensure that the United 
States does not summarily deport bona fide asylum seekers and that they have an opportunity to have 
their eligibility assessed by an immigration court.”120 If an individual is determined to have a credible 
fear of returning to their home country, they are then referred to immigration court, and the 
immigration court process begins.121 Those who fail to pass a credible fear screening remain in the 
expedited removal process. Undoubtedly, there are serious flaws in the expedited removal process 
and the administration of the credible fear interviews.122 Even so, the families who are subject to the 
FAMU Policy have passed this initial screening and are put on a track to be able to establish their 
 
 112   Case Priorities Memo, supra note 111. 
 113   See FAMU Memo, supra note 1, at 1 (citing Case Priorities Memo and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(1)(ii)). 
 114   Id. 
 115   Complaint at 44, Las Americas, No. 3:19-cv-02051-SB. 
 116   FAMU Memo, supra note 1, at 1. 
 117   See Complaint at 43, Las Americas, No. 3:19-cv-02051-SB (“On information and belief, Defendants intend to 
expand the FAMU Directive to apply across all immigration courts. . . .”). 
 118   AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL 1 (July 2019), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/primer_on_expedited_removal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7NJD-QTDA]. 
 119   Id. 
 120   HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ALLOWING CBP TO CONDUCT CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEWS UNDERMINES 
SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT REFUGEES 1 (Apr. 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/
CBP_Credible_Fear.pdf [https://perma.cc/H98Z-6DRB]. 
 121   See Credible Fear FAQ, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
and-asylum/asylum/questions-and-answers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/5BXG-MTMY] (explaining that if an 
asylum officer determines that an individual has a credible fear, their case is referred to an IJ for a full hearing on the claim). 
 122   See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120 (highlighting ways in which the credible fear interview process 
fails to protect the rights of potential asylees). 
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claims. As such, this opportunity should be protected while nonetheless scrutinizing the broader 
process. 
Second, the acceleration of families’ cases under the FAMU Policy imposes tighter time 
restrictions than other restrictions established in immigration law. The Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) states that, “in the absence of exceptional circumstances, final administrative adjudication 
of the asylum application, not including administrative appeal, shall be completed within 180 days 
after the date an application is filed.”123 The importance of completing asylum applications 
expeditiously was reinforced by an EOIR memo published just days after the FAMU Memo.124 The 
language of the INA clearly states that the 180-day period begins after an individual has submitted an 
asylum application.125 Generally speaking, an asylum application must be filed within one year of 
arriving in the United States,126 meaning that applicants statutorily are entitled to approximately one 
year and six months to prepare their case before final adjudication. This stands in stark contrast to the 
FAMU Memo, which requires that the cases simply be completed within one year of filing the 
NTA.127 Under this policy, the clock starts ticking for recently-arrived families before they have ever 
been to court and before they ever know how to find an attorney, further reducing the time available 
to them to prepare their case.128 While this Article focuses on challenging the FAMU Memo on the 
basis of due process, there may be other legal challenges to this memo as well.129 
It is within this context that practitioners must challenge the removal of recently arrived 
families: immigrants do not have the right to an attorney, immigration court staff are overworked and 
overwhelmed, and IJs are restricted in the management of their dockets. As a result of rushed trial 






 123   8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) (2020). 
 124   See Memorandum from James R. McHenry III to All of EOIR (Nov. 19, 2018), Guidance Regarding the 
Adjudication of Asylum Applications Consistent with INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(iii), https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/page/file/1112581/download [https://perma.cc/96DN-Z9JX] (explaining that timely processing of asylum cases “will 
ensure that aliens with meritorious claims will not have to wait any longer than necessary to receive benefits associated with 
asylee status while aliens with unmeritorious claims will be allowed to depart voluntarily or removed as expeditiously as 
possible”). 
 125   8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) (2020). 
 126   8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2020). 
 127   See FAMU Memo, supra note 1, at 1 (reporting that “these cases are being docketed in an expeditious manner with 
the expectation that they will be completed within one year or less”). 
 128   See Complaint at 52, Las Americas, No. 3:19-cv-02051-SB (explaining that respondents often only first learn about 
their rights or how to find counsel during their first court appearance). 
 129   An examination of other legal bases for challenging the FAMU Memo is beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, in December 2019, the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a complaint to challenge several asylum-related policies, 
including the FAMU Policy. See generally id. 
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II. SUMMARY OF DUE PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION COURT 
Those who are physically present in the United States, even if their presence is “unlawful, 
involuntary, or transitory,”130 possess due process rights.131 In the context of a removal hearing, 
immigrants who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after 
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness. . . .”132 The Supreme Court has 
recognized since 1950 that due process in removal proceedings requires a full and fair hearing.133 In 
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath the Supreme Court stated that 
[w]hen the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a 
tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. A 
deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in 
the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life 
itself.134  
Relatedly, due process requires the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine the 
government.135 These rights are codified in the INA. 136 Despite a 2018 decision by the Attorney 
General that appears to weaken these protections, the statute has not been amended by Congress nor 
have the courts changed the requirements of due process under Mathews v. Eldridge.137 
While it is clear that immigrants have these rights, what test the courts use to determine 
whether these rights have been violated is not as straightforward as it may seem. Generally speaking, 
in cases where someone’s procedural due process rights are being infringed, the three-part test from 
Mathews governs. Mathews requires courts to examine, first, 
 
 
 130   Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). 
 131   Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
 132   Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 
 133   Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-51 (1950), superseded by statute, Supplemental Appropriation Act of 
1951, Pub. L. No. 843, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 403(a)(47), 
66 Stat. 163, 279. 
 134   339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). 
 135   See Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A vital hallmark of a full and fair hearing is the 
opportunity to present evidence and testimony on one’s behalf.”); Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 2004) (“For 
a deportation hearing to be fair, an IJ must allow a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence and present witnesses.”). 
 136   See 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2020). 
 137   In March 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a one-page decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-, vacating a 
decision by the Board which restated and reiterated the right to a trial in asylum. See Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 
(U.S. Att’y Gen. 2018), vacating 26 I. & N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 2014). The Attorney General stated that he was vacating the 
decision because the asylum case for which the decision was originally sought was withdrawn, and made no other statements 
regarding the right to an asylum hearing. For more analysis on this case and its implications beyond asylum cases, see Jeffrey 
Chase, The AG’s Strange Decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW (Mar. 10, 2018), 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/10/the-ags-strange-decision-in-matter-of-e-f-h-l- [https://perma.cc/6DAF-
25NS]. 
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The private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.138  
Mathews was not an immigration case, but its test has since been applied in the immigration 
context in Landon v. Plasencia.139 While Plasencia brought the Mathews test to immigration, it is not 
applied uniformly in all immigration cases. 
In the context of asylum seekers who are arguing that their due process right to a full and 
fair hearing has been violated in court, circuits where the 2018 FAMU Memo is in effect140 and the 
BIA apply similar variations of the “no prejudice” test. The contours of this test are not identical 
across the circuits. In most circuits, it requires an asylum seeker to show that they were denied a “full 
and fair opportunity present her claims,”141 denied an opportunity “to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner,”142 or were subject to a hearing that was “so fundamentally unfair that 
the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”143 When such a violation is found, the 
asylum seeker must next show prejudice. Prejudice is generally shown “when the rights of [an] alien 
have been transgressed in such a way as is likely to impact the results of the proceedings.”144 
The various circuits have found violations of due process in many similar situations. The 
Second Circuit has held that an asylum seeker is denied a full and fair hearing when there is a lack of 
interpretation from English into a noncitizen’s native language145 and when an immigrant is deprived 
of the opportunity to present evidence.146 The Seventh Circuit has found due process violations when 
asylum seekers are unable to testify on their own behalf, particularly when IJs “bar[] complete chunks 
of oral testimony that would support the applicant’s claim.”147 The Seventh Circuit has also found 
 
 138   Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 139   459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). 
 140   The 2018 Memo specifies that the expedition applies to ten cities: Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Houston, 
Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York City, and San Francisco. FAMU Memo, supra note 1, at 1. For this reason, this 
Article will focus on precedent from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 
 141   Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Xiao Ji Chen v. United States Department of Justice, 
434 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 2006), reh’g granted, vacated on other grounds, 471 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 142   See Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Burger, 498 F.3d at 134); Getachew v. INS, 25 F.3d 
841, 845 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333). Interestingly, this standard comes from Mathews, although the full 
Mathews test is not applied. 
 143   Plateros-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 
1985)). 
 144   Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 145   Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 146   See Akhtar v. Reno, 123 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (requiring an individual making a due process 
challenge stemming from a failure to present evidence to show that “[1] he was prevented from having a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence, and (2) any such error resulted in prejudice (that is, affected the outcome of the proceeding”). 
 147   See Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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violations of due process where expert testimony148 and corroborating testimony149 have not been 
admitted. 
Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has found due process violations in several 
cases where the IJ did not allow an immigrant to testify or excluded the testimony of corroborating 
witnesses and experts. In Colmenar v. INS, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the IJ for a 
new hearing because the asylum seeker did not have a sufficient opportunity to support his claim that 
he was persecuted on account of his political opinion.150 In another case, the Ninth Circuit found a 
due process violation when the IJ refused to admit the testimony of experts and others who could 
corroborate the asylum seeker’s claims.151 In Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales,152 the Ninth Circuit stated 
that due process “prohibit[s] an [immigration judge] from declining to hear relevant testimony 
because of a prejudgment about the witness’s ‘credibility or the probative value of [the] 
testimony.’”153 Finally, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that prejudice does not “demand absolute 
certainty; rather prejudice is shown if the violation ‘potentially . . . affects the outcome of the 
proceedings.’”154 
The Fourth Circuit is comparatively reluctant to find violations of the right to a full and fair 
hearing. In Rusu v. INS, the court examined whether an asylum hearing conducted via 
videoconferencing violated an immigrant’s due process rights.155 The court acknowledged the added 
difficulty of making credibility determinations, as well as the diminished effectiveness of attorneys 
when videoconferencing is used.156 Even so, the court found no violation because the asylum seeker 
had “a meaningful opportunity to present his claim. The Immigration and Naturalization Service and 
the courts were under no obligation to ensure that Rusu made a meaningful presentation—that was 
properly left to Rusu and his lawyer.”157 The court went on to describe the problems that Rusu 
suffered as “self-inflicted.”158 
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit deviates from the precedent of the rest of the circuits, 
perceiving the standard for the “no prejudice” test to be higher than other circuits and requires that 
an asylum applicant “show that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the 
 
 148   Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 149   See Podio v. INS, 153 F.3d 506, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an IJ’s refusal allow an applicant’s siblings to 
testify and corroborate applicant’s claims of past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution deprived applicant 
of a fair hearing). 
 150   210 F.3d 967, 972–73 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 151   See Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the IJ’s exclusion of testimony 
by family members and experts denied petitioner the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf); Lopez-Umanzor v. 
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the IJ’s exclusion of expert testimony violated due process.); 
Kaur v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the IJ’s exclusion of testimony by petitioner’s son denied 
her a full and fair hearing). 
 152   405 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 153   Id. at 1056 (quoting Kaur v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 154   Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 884 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 155   296 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 156   Id. at 322-23. 
 157   Id. at 323-24. 
 158   Id. at 324. 
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asserted error caused him substantial prejudice.”159 This heightened standard is evident in the Eleventh 
Circuit’s case law, which shows an unwillingness to find due process violations in the context of 
procedures implemented by the Department of Justice across cases. In Gonzalez-Oropeza v. United 
States Attorney General,160 the Eleventh Circuit found no due process violation when an asylum 
applicant’s case was affirmed through an affirmance without opinion by the BIA.161 This is 
particularly relevant, as the acceleration of family cases is a widely (if not universally) applied policy by 
the Department of Justice. 
III. THE FAMU POLICY VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS 
The FAMU Policy violates the due process rights of immigrant families seeking asylum 
because it deprives them of the opportunity to have a full and fair hearing on the merits of their 
cases. The inability to fully present their cases before the immigration courts ultimately results in 
prejudice to these families. The following Sections will analyze the impacts of the FAMU Policy 
through the lens of case law across the circuits where the policy has been implemented. 
Understandably, some case law will be more favorable than others with respect to due process. Even 
taking into account these differences across circuits, the FAMU Policy nonetheless violates the due 
process rights of immigrant families and ultimately prejudices their cases. For individual practitioners 
representing asylum seekers, these arguments can be bolstered by the individual facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
The acceleration of immigrant families’ cases leads to two specific problems that create 
violations of the right to a full and fair hearing: the increased difficulty of obtaining necessary 
evidence and the effects of trauma. These problems will be examined in turn, and this Section will 
show how each of these problems results in a violation of due process, as well as prejudice to the 
immigrants’ cases. 
A. Insufficient Time to Gather Evidence Violates Due Process 
The acceleration of family unit cases makes it extremely difficult for asylum seekers to 
collect the evidence that they need in their cases. As described supra, immigration law places the 
burden on the asylum seeker to demonstrate that they are eligible for such relief.162 It is thus the 
responsibility of asylum seekers, and their attorneys, to collect all of the evidence necessary to prove 
their case. This Section will first describe the statutory and precedential requirements around 
corroborating evidence, and then discuss practical difficulties of obtaining this evidence. This Section 
will conclude by explaining how these difficulties create circumstances in which the FAMU Policy 
violates families’ due process rights. 
 
 159   Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Matthews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)), overruled on separate grounds by Patel v. United States Attorney General, No. 17-10636, 2020 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 26347, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 19, 2020). The Eleventh Circuit’s heightened standard for prejudice can be traced 
back to Fifth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lober, 630 F.2d 335, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 160   321 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 161   Id. at 1333. 
 162   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2020). 
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1. The legal importance of corroborating evidence 
Although an applicant’s testimony may be sufficient to meet their burden in theory,163 this is 
not the case in practice. In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act,164 which “drastically expanded 
the codified standards by which immigration adjudicators evaluate the veracity of an asylum 
applicant’s claim.”165 Now, “where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide 
evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the 
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain it.”166 
Furthermore, an IJ can deny an applicant’s case because they did not provide the 
corroborating evidence that an IJ believed was needed, even without advance notice of the desired 
evidence or a continuance to obtain that evidence.167 In Matter of L-A-C-, the BIA analyzed the 
requirements under the REAL ID Act with respect to corroboration and what procedures an IJ must 
follow before denying a case. Through statutory interpretation and pre-existing case law, the BIA 
found no requirement that an IJ articulate the specific evidence that should be provided, nor did they 
find a requirement that the judge offer a continuance.168 In essence, the requirements of the REAL 
ID Act are notice enough to provide the necessary evidence.169 
In many cases, corroborating and supporting evidence makes the difference between 
receiving protection and not. In Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit relied on the statements of 
two country conditions experts to decide that the agency erred in its determinations around the 
“nexus” requirement.170 The court discussed how Ms. Lagos submitted “voluminous documentary 
evidence,” which included the testimony of one country conditions expert and the affidavit of 
another.171 On issues related to nexus and an imputed political opinion claim, her “experts were clear 
and unrebutted.”172 The court cited her experts’ opinions throughout their decision and found that 
they were persuasive.173 Similarly, in Hernandez-Chacon, the Second Circuit found that the BIA and IJ 
did not adequately consider Ms. Hernandez-Chacon’s political opinion claims in light of the 
 
 163   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2020) (“The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden 
of proof without corroboration”). But see Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1139 (BIA 1998) (holding that the applicant’s 
testimony did not meet the burden of proof despite the absence of an adverse credibility finding). 
 164   Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 165   Melanie A. Conroy, Real Bias: How REAL ID’s Credibility and Corroboration Requirements Impair Sexual Minority Asylum 
Applicants, BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 1, 1 (2009). 
 166   8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2020) (emphasis added). 
 167   Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 2015). This standard has been adopted by at least one Circuit Court. See 
Wei Sun v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2018) (ruling that an immigration judge is not required to give applicant notice of 
evidence needed). But see Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) (“It would make no sense to ask whether the 
applicant can obtain the information unless he is to be given a chance to do so. . . . An applicant must be given notice of the 
corroboration required, and an opportunity to either provide that corroboration. . . .). 
 168   Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 520-21 (BIA 2015). 
 169   See Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he REAL ID Act clearly states that corroborative 
evidence may be required, placing immigrants on notice of the consequences for failing to provide corroborating evidence.”). 
 170   927 F.3d 236, 248-52 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 171   Id. at 244-45. 
 172   Id. at 251. 
 173   Id. at 250-52. 
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conditions in El Salvador.174 In reaching this decision, the court relied heavily on evidence of country 
conditions submitted in the record, such as the declaration of a lawyer and human rights specialist, 
the U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2015 in El Salvador, and 
an article by the Associated Press.175 Both circuit courts similarly relied on this type of evidence to 
reach important conclusions in Ms. Lagos’s and Ms. Hernandez-Chacon’s cases. If Ms. Lagos’s or Ms. 
Herandez-Chacon’s attorneys did not have the time to collaborate with these experts to receive their 
affidavits and prepare them for trial, the outcomes in their cases would very likely have been 
different. 
Similar to the absence of expert affidavits, a lack of sufficient country conditions evidence 
underlies the decisions in recent Attorney General decisions. In Matter of E-R-A-L-, the BIA found 
that the Respondent’s proposed social grouping of “Guatemalan landowners” and “landowners who 
resist drug cartels in Guatemala” was not cognizable based on the “evidence in the record.”176 
Specifically, the BIA built upon earlier case law, ruling that a social group’s “ultimate validity will 
depend on whether the particular facts, country and societal conditions, and individual circumstances 
establish” that a group is socially distinct in the society in question,177 which can only be shown 
through country conditions reports and expert affidavits. Similarly, in Matter of L-E-A-, the Attorney 
General reinforced the notion that determinations of whether social groups are cognizable must be 
made on an individualized basis and examine the specific facts and cultural circumstances underlying 
the case.178 Additionally, a lack of corroborating evidence was a basis for denial in Matter of L-A-C-.179 
In that case, the BIA determined that, even if the IJ had found the applicant credible, he submitted 
too little supporting evidence to corroborate his specific claim.180 
These cases show the necessity that practitioners include evidence such as country 
conditions expert affidavits, foreign constitutions, and foreign family law statutes. All of this evidence 
is required by precedent and takes time to collect—time that families subject to the FAMU Policy do 
not have. 
2. The realities of obtaining corroborating evidence 
As a practical matter, obtaining evidence from an asylum seeker’s home country is not easy. 
Asylum seekers often do not leave their country with all the corroborating affidavits and 
documentation that an IJ may want to see.181 Therefore, many asylum seekers attempt to obtain these 
documents remotely, often with the help of friends or family. Despite advances in technology that 
 
 174   Hernandez Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 175   Id. at 99-100. 
 176   27 I&N Dec. 767, 768, 770-72 (B.I.A. 2020). 
 177   Id. at 770. 
 178   27 I&N Dec. 581, 586 (Op. Att’ys Gen. 2019). 
 179   26 I&N Dec. 516, 526-27 (B.I.A. 2015). 
 180   Id. at 525. 
 181   See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Authentic refugees rarely are able to offer 
direct corroboration of specific threats. . . . Persecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their 
acts of persecution.”); 151 CONG. REC. 9025 (2005) (statement of Sen. Brownback) (“[T]hose who flee a country often times 
don’t have time to gather up the proper documentation they may later need in an American immigration court.”). 
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may allow family members abroad to quickly send a statement via email or take a picture of a relevant 
document, these methods are not sufficient. Without an original document that the government can 
inspect, the document may be admitted into evidence but will be given very little weight by the IJ.182 
Therefore, attorneys must counsel their clients that their friends and family members must mail 
original copies of birth certificates, death certificates, affidavits, business records, and any other 
documents to them in the United States. Receiving mail from Central America or anywhere else in the 
world can take several weeks or months, and more time is needed once the document is received by 
an attorney in order to translate it for the immigration court.183 
Additionally, many asylum seekers increasingly have digital evidence, such as photos of 
injuries taken on their cell phones, videos of attacks or political protests, and audio and text messages 
from persecutors. In the Author’s experience, many asylum seekers leave these phones in their home 
country so that evidence they may have had at one point—including direct evidence of the words of a 
persecutor—is no longer available. Even where such evidence is available, there are so few 
procedures in place for electronic evidence that it is unclear if the court would admit it or give it 
proper weight.184 
Attorneys must also help their clients secure physical, psychological, or gynecological 
evaluations in order to prove their case.185 Physical and gynecological evaluations document scars and 
injuries that cannot be shown in the courtroom, such as scars from where someone was beaten by the 
police in their country or where they were subjected to female genital mutilation. Psychological 
evaluations can also corroborate an asylum seeker’s testimony and explain why someone may not 
remember particular events. For example, upon hearing that an asylum applicant sustained repeated 
head injuries, a doctor’s evaluation can explain to the court that traumatic brain injury could cause the 
asylum seeker to forget certain facts of their case. This could be critical to helping a judge find an 
asylum seeker to be credible.186 These evaluations make a real difference. According to the human 
rights advocacy organization Physicians for Human Rights, immigrants who work with a forensic 
evaluator are granted asylum at a rate of approximately 90%, compared to a national average of about 
 
 182   See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 51 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1205666/download [https://perma.cc/WEW9-2NBA] (noting that the applicant must 
make the originals of supporting documents available for review and “bring the originals to all individual calendar hearings”). 
 183   Id. at 43-44 (“All documents filed with the Immigration Court must be in the English language and accompanied 
by a certified English translation”). 
 184   As of the February 20, 2020 edition of the Immigration Court Practice Manual, there is no mention of procedures 
for video or audio evidence. See EOIR, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1250706/download [https://perma.cc/WEW9-2NBA]. 
 185   See David Gangsei & Ana C. Deutsch, Psychological Evaluation of Asylum Seekers as a Therapeutic Process, 17 TORTURE 
79, 79 (2007) (“Psychological evaluations of the consequences of torture can present information and evidence to asylum 
adjudicators which significantly increases understanding of the survivors’ background and experiences as well as their manner 
of self-presentation in the courtroom or interview.”). 
 186   See, e.g., Jeffrey Chase, The Importance of Expert Witnesses, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW (Aug. 24, 
2017), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/24/theimportance-of-expert-witnesses [https://perma.cc/6WRM-
Q8NE] (“[A] medical expert’s testimony might necessarily buttress an asylum applicant’s claim to have suffered past 
persecution. . . . Furthermore, a psychological expert might provide a medical explanation for problems with the applicant’s 
factual recall or demeanor, both of which are factors that can be relied on by an immigration judge to support an adverse 
credibility finding.”). 
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30%.187 Those who are unable to obtain these evaluations are thus at a severe disadvantage compared 
to those with evaluations. 
Obtaining these evaluations takes time. For instance, Physicians for Human Rights requires 
that evaluation requests be submitted at least 12 weeks (approximately three months) before the 
affidavit’s submission is due to the court.188 There is no guarantee that an evaluation will be found in 
that time or in a shorter period of time. In New York City, Individual Hearings for these priority 
cases are usually scheduled approximately two to three months after the last Master Calendar Hearing 
on the case, which is generally the hearing when the asylum application is submitted. This is barely 
enough time to obtain an evaluation and does not allow for human error, delay, or circumstances 
outside the control of an asylum seeker and their attorney. 
Similar to evaluations, expert affidavits and testimony can also be crucial to an asylum 
application. Because many asylum applications implicate issues of how religious, ethnic, and sexual 
minority groups are treated in other countries, expert professionals offer a critical and necessary 
perspective on an asylum seeker’s case.189 Many of the elements of asylum, such as whether a given 
country’s government is unable or unwilling to protect the applicant, require a deep and nuanced 
understanding of the country in question. While experts are in the best position to give this 
perspective to a case, it takes time to obtain an expert affidavit and prepare the expert to testify. 
Similar to medical and psychological evaluations, finding the best expert for the particular case and 
obtaining the expert’s affidavit both take considerable time. 
In addition to expert affidavits, evaluations, and direct evidence, country conditions research 
compiled by attorneys is now more important than ever before. Attorneys spend hours compiling 
research about the conditions in a country as they are often essential to a client’s claim. This research 
includes US government and UN reports, news articles, academic articles, and much more. For 
instance, many IJs heavily rely on the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices.190 However, the reliability of these reports has come into question in the last few years due 
to a State Department policy reducing the passages on discrimination and violence against women 
and sexual and ethnic minorities.191 A 2018 report by Oxfam found that “[m]entions of women’s 
 
 187   PHR Asylum Program, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, https://phr.org/issues/asylum-and-persecution/phr-
asylum-program [https://perma.cc/W83T-TVUB] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
 188   How PHR can Help Your Client, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, https://phr.org/issues/asylum-and-
persecution/asylum-for-attorneys [https://perma.cc/J3EB-GMNS] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
 189   See Kelcey Baker, Katherine Freeman, Gigi Warner & Deborah M. Weissman, Part Three: The Role(s) of an Expert 
Witness, in EXPERT WITNESSES IN U.S. ASYLUM CASES: A HANDBOOK 35-36 (2018), https://law.unc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/expertwitnesshandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVQ3-QNGQ]. 
 190   See Susan K. Kerns, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 
INDIANA J. GLOBAL L. STUDIES 197, 197 (2000) (citing Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000)); OXFAM, SINS OF 
OMISSION: WOMEN’S AND LGBTI RIGHTS REPORTING UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 3 (2018), 
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/research-publications/sins-of-omission [https://perma.cc/SK5F-EQ4N] (“[T]hese 
reports are go-to resources for parties in asylum cases who seek to establish the dangers asylum seekers face in their home 
countries . . . “); Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209, 213 (B.I.A. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. 
Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that Department of State Reports “are highly probative evidence and are usually 
the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations”). 
 191   See generally Nahal Toosi, State Department report will trim language on women’s rights, discrimination, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 
2018, 10:03 PM EST), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/21/department-women-rights-abortion-420361 
[https://perma.cc/AQ67-C55C] (noting the removal of certain passages related to sexual discrimination could undermine the 
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rights and issues—such as references to domestic abuse or sexual harassment—were down 32 
percent in the 2017 reports relative to 2016 and 29 percent relative to 2015.”192 Even worse, 
“[c]ountries of origin of asylum seekers to the United States have seen their reporting on women’s 
rights and issues decline even more.”193 This policy disproportionately impacts women and other 
minorities seeking asylum, especially in cases based on sexual and gender-based violence, because it 
makes it even more difficult for attorneys to find the evidence necessary to support their clients’ 
claims. Sufficient country conditions evidence – including reports from nongovernmental 
organizations, academics, and news agencies – must be submitted to counteract these omissions and 
takes many hours to find and compile. 
3. Due process concerns with corroborating evidence under FAMU 
With the pressure to hear families’ cases so quickly, it is virtually impossible to obtain all of 
the relevant and necessary evidence by the filing deadline. The FAMU Policy has created a situation 
akin to if IJs were to bar all expert testimony and other corroborating testimony. While in reality the 
individual IJ is not the one actively excluding the testimony, the Policy has created circumstances 
under which this evidence is necessarily excluded because it could not be obtained by the filing 
deadline or the hearing date. As a result, asylum seekers are denied a full hearing because they are 
unable to present the evidence necessary to support their claims. Asylum seekers cannot present to 
the court the full picture of what they experienced and the effect that the persecution had on them. 
Without documents from their home country, it is extremely difficult to corroborate an asylum 
seeker’s claims. Additionally, without a psychological or physical evaluation, the effects of the 
persecution are not apparent to the court. With these obstacles in place, asylum seekers lack the time 
to obtain the necessary evidence and are thus deprived of a full and fair hearing. 
The inability to present the evidence necessary to support their claims prejudices asylum 
seekers. As described supra, this evidence helps them to corroborate their cases and bolster their 
credibility, while providing IJs the necessary perspective on the asylum seeker’s country of origin. 
This information goes directly to several elements of an asylum case, such as whether the asylum 
applicant was a member of a particular social group and whether the persecution was on account of a 
protected ground.194 By depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to present this evidence, the 
FAMU Policy ultimately prejudices asylum seekers. 
 
reports’ impact and integrity). 
 192   OXFAM, SINS OF OMISSION: WOMEN’S AND LGBTI RIGHTS REPORTING UNDER THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION, 3 (2018), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/research-publications/sins-of-omission 
[https://perma.cc/K2JM-G8VE]. 
 193   Id.; see also id. at 11 (“Consistent with last year’s findings, countries sending more asylum seekers to the United 
States see larger decreases in reporting on women’s issues/rights”). 
 194   See generally Jeffrey Chase, The Importance of Expert Witnesses, OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION LAW (Aug. 
24, 2017), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/24/theimportance-of-expert-witnesses [https://perma.cc/2RQZ-
L6VV] (“An asylum applicant may also offer a country expert to testify as to conditions in the applicant’s country of nationality 
that would provide objective support for the applicant’s subjective fear of persecution.”). 
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B. Insufficient Time to Recover from Trauma Violates Due Process 
1. Trauma and asylum-seeking families 
Families who have suffered trauma in their countries need time to recover and build rapport 
with their attorneys. As described by the American Psychological Association, trauma refers to an 
emotional response to a terrible event like an accident, rape or natural disaster. 
Immediately after the event, shock and denial are typical. Longer term reactions 
include unpredictable emotions, flashbacks, strained relationships and even 
physical symptoms like headaches or nausea. While these feelings are normal, some 
people have difficulty moving on with their lives.195  
For some asylum seekers, the trauma they have experienced may lead to posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). One clinical psychologist noted that “asylum seekers demonstrate higher rates of 
PTSD than refugees, suggesting that the instability associated with that lack of refugee status — and 
perhaps the stressors of the asylum process itself — contribute to poorer mental health outcomes.”196 
In addition to the trauma asylum seekers experience from persecution, many also experience 
trauma while immigrating to, and upon arriving in, the United States. For example, “NGOS serving 
migrants 'estimate that a high percentage of girls, women, and LGBTI persons' experience sexual or 
gender-based violence 'during their journeys' from Central America to the United States.”197 In 
Mexico, groups of migrants have experienced kidnappings at the hands of drug trafficking cartels and 
other organized crime organizations, who demand ransom payments and sometimes collude with 
human smugglers who were contracted to transport the migrants.198 Asylum seekers can also 
experience trauma after they arrive in the United States, including while they are in detention199 or in 
the communities where they live.200 
 
 195   Trauma and Shock, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/topics/trauma [https://perma.cc/DP7Q-WDR6] 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
 196   Katherine Lee, Seeking Sanctuary, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. (July / Aug., 2017), 
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/07-08/sanctuary [https://perma.cc/7MGE-G8AJ]. 
 197   KIDS IN NEED OF DEFENSE, CHILDHOOD CUT SHORT 28 (2017), https://supportkind.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Childhood-Cut-Short-KIND-SGBV-Report_June2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBZ8-M6FF]. 
 198   Id. at 29. 
 199   See, e.g., US: Trauma in Family Immigration Detention, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 15, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/15/us-trauma-family-immigration-detention-0 [https://perma.cc/8YCQ-KJQT] 
(“Mothers from 25 detained families, including 10 who had been locked up for 8 to 10 months, described to Human Rights 
Watch their family’s trauma, depression, and suicidal thoughts.”). 
 200   See Krista M. Perreira & India Ornelas, Painful Passages: Traumatic Experiences and Post-Traumatic Stress among Immigrant 
Latino Adolescents and their Primary Caregivers, 47 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 976, 982 (2013) (noting that hardships encountered 
after arriving in the U.S., such as racial-ethnic discrimination, can “both increase the likelihood that they will experience trauma 
and that trauma will result in sub-clinical or clinical levels of PTSD symptoms.”). 
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2. The effects of trauma on asylum cases 
i. How trauma impacts the attorney-client relationship 
The effects of trauma, irrespective of a PTSD diagnosis, “can interfere with the formation 
of strong client-attorney relationships by impairing the client’s capacity to trust others, process 
information, communicate, and respond to stressful situations.”201 For example, when a client is 
asked about the traumatic event that they experienced, they may go into a “flight, fight, or freeze,”202 
reaction, making it difficult for them to answer their attorney’s questions or answer those questions in 
a chronological, organized way that is most helpful to the attorney. Trauma may also cause clients to 
be inconsistent over the course of several interviews with attorneys and their legal staff. Such 
inconsistencies in an asylum seeker’s testimony can be caused by PTSD203 or even traumatic brain 
injury.204 During the interview, those who have experienced trauma may refuse to answer questions, 
become loud or combative when being interviewed, or stop paying attention to a meeting 
altogether.205 Additionally, clients who experience trauma may cancel meetings with very short notice 
or simply not show up.206 While these responses from clients can be frustrating for attorneys, it is 
crucial to understand that clients engage in this behavior as a form of self-preservation, not because 
they are lying or because the meeting lacks importance to them. 
Because of the impacts of trauma, attorneys must spend more time investing in the attorney-
client relationship and building rapport with a client. In addition to gathering information necessary 
to make a claim, trauma-informed lawyering requires that attorneys make meetings predictable, 
manage clients’ emotions to ensure that they are not triggered by a conversation, and invest time 
during a meeting to talk about topics aside from the case in order to build rapport with their clients.207 
Attorneys must also give clients sufficient time to complete requested tasks, such as getting 
 




 202   Sarah Katz & Deeya Haldar, The Pedagogy of Trauma-Informed Lawyering, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 359, 366 (2016). 
 203   Landy F. Sparr & J. Douglas Bremner, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Memory: Prescient Medicolegal Testimony at the 
International War Crimes Tribunal?, 33 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 71, 71 (2005). 
 204   See Will Stone, Domestic Violence’s Overlooked Damage: Concussion And Brain Injury, Kaiser Health News (June 1, 2018), 
https://khn.org/news/domestic-violences-overlooked-damage-concussion-and-brain-injury [https://perma.cc/HWQ3-AZJL] 
(describing how head injuries can impact memory); NEW YORK STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC ABUSE AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY, https://opdv.ny.gov/professionals/tbi/
dvandtbi_infoguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6MV-NR23] (describing how traumatic brain injury can cause impairments in 
cognition, emotions, and communication, as well as memory loss). 
 205   National Child Trauma Stress Network, supra note 201. 
 206   See, e.g., Lynette M. Parker, Increasing Law Students’ Effectiveness When Representing Traumatized Clients: A Case Study of 
the Katharine & George Alexander Community Law Center, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J, 163, 170 (2007). 
 207   See NAT’L CENTER ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAUMA, AND MENTAL HEALTH, TRAUMA-INFORMED LEGAL 
ADVOCACY: PRACTICE SCENARIOS SERIES (2015), http://www.nationalcenterdvtraumamh.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/08/TILA_Traumatic_TriggersApr22.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU3L-QZ5A]; see also Carol M. Suzuki, Unpacking Pandora’s 
Box: Innovative Techniques for Effectively Counseling Asylum Applicants Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 4 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 235, 264-270 (2007) (discussing specific interview techniques when working with trauma survivors). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
 24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2021)  
30 
 
documents or attending a psychological evaluation. In some instances, clients are dealing with 
physical illnesses because their trauma manifests as physiological symptoms.208 In sum, trauma can 
present effects on asylum seekers that may prevent them from working efficiently with their 
attorneys, even as this efficiency becomes essential to succeeding in such an accelerated and crucial 
process.209 
ii. How trauma impacts the hearing 
Trauma can also impact an asylum applicant during their hearing. Similar to client meetings 
with an attorney, a judge’s questions can be emotionally triggering, leading clients to become 
combative, shut down altogether and refuse to answer questions, or get so emotional that answering 
questions becomes difficult. 
This response can be exacerbated by an IJ’s or ICE trial attorney’s demeanor. Researchers 
who observed Individual Hearings in asylum seekers’ cases in the 1980s found that trial attorneys at 
the INS (ICE’s predecessor) “took an oppositional stance in every case.”210 According to the 
researchers, who observed 193 asylum hearings over an 18-month period, INS trial attorneys 
“conducted lengthy and aggressive cross-examinations,”211 and were often “hostile, sarcastic, or 
disbelieving.”212 These observations are consistent with more recent documented observations and 
the author’s own experience.213 IJs have been documented to exhibit similar patterns of 
questioning.214 Hostile and disbelieving attitudes run counter to trauma-informed practices, 
exacerbating asylum seekers’ trauma responses.215 In the face of such adverse questioning methods, 
asylum seekers’ responses can lead to inconsistencies, unwillingness to continue with testimony, or 
hostility toward the ICE attorney or IJ. These behaviors can in turn lead to adverse credibility 
findings216 and, ultimately, a removal order. 
 
 208   See generally Madhulika A. Gupta, Review of somatic symptoms in post-traumatic stress disorder, 25 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 
86, 86-87 (2013). 
 209   A pattern of behavior where clients regularly miss appointments with their attorney, fail to schedule 
appointments, or arrive late (or not at all) to evaluations scheduled by the attorney is consistent with avoidance symptoms of 
PTSD. See Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, The Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
693, 703 (2008). (“[I]ndividuals suffering from PTSD habitually avoid ‘people[,] places, thoughts, or activities that bring back 
memories of the trauma.’”). 
 210   Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in 
an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 492 (1992). 
 211   Id. at 493. 
 212   Id. 
 213   See Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 43 (2014) 
(summarizing empirical studies from 2009, 2011, and 2012 on removal proceedings). 
 214   See, e.g., Fiadjoe v. Attorney General of the United States, 411 F.3d 135, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing the 
“bullying nature” of the immigration judge’s questions). 
 215   See NAT’L CENTER ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAUMA, AND MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 207, at 3 (describing 
how “[n]oticing and validating someone’s feelings” is a suggested course of action when someone is triggered). 
 216   See Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 154-55 (describing how “[p]oor interview techniques” negatively impacted the appellant’s 
ability to respond to questioning, which “most certainly” led to a negative credibility finding). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol24/iss1/2
 IN-AND-OUT JUSTICE  
31 
 
3. Asylum law’s recognition of the impact of trauma 
Asylum law already recognizes that one year may be insufficient time for survivors of 
trauma to prepare their asylum applications. Under the INA, asylum seekers must file their asylum 
application within one year of arrival in the United States to be eligible.217 However, if an applicant 
files outside of that one-year window, they can still be eligible for asylum if they show that they were 
subject to changed or extraordinary circumstances, and then filed within a reasonable amount of 
time.218 Extraordinary circumstances “refer to events or factors directly related to the failure to meet 
the one-year deadline.”219 One category of these extraordinary circumstances already contemplated by 
the regulations include “serious illness or mental or physical disability, including any effects of persecution 
or violent harm suffered in the past.”220 PTSD has been recognized, and not challenged, in the First Circuit 
as a basis for extraordinary circumstances.221 The circumstance must be carefully documented, 
however, because PTSD and trauma symptoms are so common among asylum seekers that, by some 
accounts, adjudicators have come to take a jaded view of this exception.222 
For over two decades, federal immigration law has led the Department of Justice to 
recognize that the effects of persecution and harm may reasonably delay asylum seekers from 
completing their asylum applications. It then defies the purpose of these well-established regulations 
to require that asylum seekers not only apply for asylum, but also reach a conclusion in their case, all 
within one year. 
4. Trauma and the FAMU Policy 
When EOIR accelerates the case of a family who is traumatized by the violence they have 
witnessed or suffered in their home country, it takes a toll on the quality of the subsequent hearing. 
Attorneys need time to work with traumatized clients and earn their trust. Once that trust is earned, 
clients are more likely to open up about the details of what happened to them. Often, clients have 
experienced much more than they divulge at the first meeting, especially when such experiences 
include severe forms of persecution such as sexual assault or torture. They may not feel comfortable 
sharing these facts in a first meeting but will often share them after a second, third, fourth, or fifth 
meeting over the course of several months or even years. When an attorney only has one or two 
opportunities to meet with a client before an application for asylum is due, those facts will be omitted 
from the application, which will appear weaker or even contradictory to later statements. And when 
an Individual Hearing date is set so quickly, an attorney will have less time to build the rapport 
 
 217   8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2020). 
 218   8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2020); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii) (2020). 
 219   8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) (2020). This language has remained unchanged since the regulations were promulgated in 
1997. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; 
Asylum Procedures, 97 Fed. Reg. 10339 (Mar. 6, 1997). 
 220   8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(i) (2020) (emphasis added). 
 221   Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 222   See Victoria Neilson & Aaron Morris, The Gay Bar: The Effect of the One-Year Filing Deadline on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender and HIV-Positive Foreign Nationals Seeking Asylum or Withholding of Removal, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 233, 270 n. 218 (2005); 
see also Musalo & Rice, supra note 209, at 704-06 (describing instances in which immigration judges and asylum officers denied 
asylum applications because they incorrectly understood the effects of trauma). 
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necessary to get their client’s full story so that it can be presented to the judge. 
Because of the pressure to complete FAMU cases quickly, attorneys are simply not afforded 
the time required to build relationships with their clients. Because of the high rates of PTSD among 
asylum seekers, this time pressure can inhibit an attorney’s ability to work with an asylum-seeking 
client. In turn, the attorney may fail to achieve a full understanding of the asylum seeker’s case and 
may inadequately prepare their clients for the stress that is inherent in an Individual Hearing. 
Additionally, without time to seek treatment, an asylum seeker may not be able to fully articulate what 
happened to them or what they experienced. 
If an asylum seeker’s mental health prevents them from telling their whole story, they do not 
get a full and fair hearing. This failure is different from focusing testimony, which necessarily happens 
in every case. Not everything that an asylum seeker has experienced will rise to the level of 
persecution or merit a grant of asylum. However, if an asylum seeker’s mental health prevents them 
from speaking to their attorney about all the details of what they experienced, their case will not be 
fully presented to the judge. 
Similarly, a rushed process may raise more inconsistencies, leading to an adverse credibility 
finding. This is not through the fault of the asylum seeker, as they are not intending to deceive. As 
discussed supra, inconsistencies may be the result of physical injuries or of PTSD. Inconsistencies may 
also arise out of a learned survival technique. Without time to seek mental health treatment or to 
build a relationship with their attorney, an asylum seeker with a factually meritorious application may 
be deemed not credible and denied protection. 
The rush to trial ultimately prejudices immigrants. The specific manner by which traumatic 
experiences present challenges to receiving a fair hearing will depend on the facts of each asylum 
seeker’s case. Still, when an asylum seeker is unable or unwilling to share certain traumatic facts 
because of mental health circumstances, the IJ cannot assess all the relevant harms the asylum seeker 
may have suffered. The evidence is overwhelming that immigrants are being removed from the 
United States under the FAMU Policy because they are not able to express everything they suffered in 
their home country. Put differently, there are people who are properly qualified to receive asylum, 
Withholding of Removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture but are denied relief 
because the FAMU Policy prevents them from articulating their entire case.223 Similarly, there are 
people whose removal from the United States relies on specious adverse credibility findings and who, 
absent the FAMU Policy, could have received counseling and proper treatment to help them explain 
their inconsistencies so to be found credible. In other words, the FAMU Policy fundamentally 





 223   See, e.g., Carol M. Suzuki, Unpacking Pandora’s Box: Innovative Techniques for Effectively Counseling Asylum Applicants 
Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 235, 239 (2007) (“There is an inescapable and 
cruel paradox evident when one considers the ramifications of PTSD on an asylum claim—those who suffer from PTSD 
because of their trauma experiences, and who are deserving of asylum in the United States, may be denied asylum as a direct 
result of the symptoms of their affliction”). 
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C. Potential Critiques and Questions 
The arguments advanced in this Article about the acceleration of families’ asylum cases are 
necessarily generalized but nonetheless invite critique. One such critique would follow the Fourth 
Circuit’s logic in Rusu: that asylum seekers, by having a hearing at all, have the opportunity to present 
their case.224 That is, if an asylum seeker is unable to articulate their fears because of their trauma or 
cannot obtain the evidence, that is the burden of the asylum seeker and their attorney, and not the 
government. This critique ignores the very heart of due process. A fundamental concern of due 
process is whether someone had an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful 
manner.”225 This critique focuses on the opportunity but not the requirement that it be meaningful. As 
a matter of judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court in Mathews would not have included this 
language if it were superfluous. Asylum seekers may be given an opportunity to state their case in a 
hearing, but without the evidence to support their case or the ability to articulate their fears, the 
hearing is not at a meaningful time or in a meaningful way, as due process requires. 
Another critique contends that as FAMU is not the only expedited proceeding, it is no 
different than others that courts have been reluctant to strike down. While FAMU may not be the 
only expedited proceeding, its faults go to the very heart of fairness in adjudications. FAMU is the 
only type of case where such tight restrictions are imposed on the discretion of IJs.226 The FAMU 
Policy directly contravenes notions of fairness and process upon which courts are built. If the FAMU 
Policy were to continue and expand, or if a similar policy were put in place by a future 
Administration, thousands more asylum-seeking families would be deprived of their fair day in court 
to which they are entitled. 
How the FAMU Policy and the June Proposed Asylum Rule will interact remains an open 
question as of this Article’s publication. In June 2020, the Trump Administration published a Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking that, among other sweeping changes, allows IJs to pretermit asylum claims 
based on the application and supporting evidence alone, without a hearing.227 It is unclear how 
FAMU cases will be treated if this rule goes into effect, or at what stage an IJ might look to pretermit 
a case. The impact of the proposed rule, and its interaction with the FAMU Policy, will undoubtedly 
raise more due process questions for families seeking asylum, especially if it gives families even less 
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IV. HOW MUCH TIME IS ENOUGH? 
This Article does not ultimately settle the question of how much time is enough time for an 
asylum-seeking family to prepare their asylum case. Because of the immigration court backlog, this is 
an increasingly complex question. As described in this Article, the federal government throws recently 
arrived families through the adjudicatory system as quickly as possible, without the opportunity to 
fully prepare for their hearings. Meanwhile, on the opposite end of the spectrum, many other asylum 
seekers’ cases are languishing in the immigration court backlog.228 This in turn affects the ability of 
their counsel to fully and fairly represent them as memories fade, witnesses die or can no longer be 
found, or country conditions change over many years. Under current case law, it is unclear how much 
time the due process clause would require and what the minimum—and maximum times—required 
by due process may be. 
Despite that uncertainty, the experiences with FAMU suggest that the time required by the 
settlement agreement from B.H. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al. (known as A.B.T. v. 
USCIS or the ABT settlement) may not be sufficient.229 In A.B.T. v. USCIS, class members argued 
that Department of Homeland Security policies unlawfully prevented them from obtaining work 
authorization while their asylum applications were pending.230 Under the settlement, the government 
agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to a minimum of forty-five days between the last Master 
Calendar Hearing and the Individual Hearing.231 As described supra, IJs in New York are giving 
approximately two to three months (sixty to ninety days) between the last Master Calendar Hearing 
and the Individual Hearing.232 However, even this amount of time is not enough to fully prepare a 
case, which requires not only gathering all the necessary evidence but also ensuring that clients are 
psychologically prepared for Individual Hearings. While it has not established a ceiling, this Article 
shows that the floor for how soon hearings should be scheduled should be significantly higher than 
that agreed upon in the ABT settlement. The full contours of what that amount of time should be, 
especially in light of due process concerns arising on the other time extreme, will need to be the 
subject of its own article. 
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The immigration court system is under extreme pressure originating from structural flaws 
that have been exacerbated by the actions of the Trump Administration. There is tremendous need to 
fix this system so that everyone’s cases are heard fairly and in a timely manner. However, this need 
does not outweigh the rights of families fleeing extreme violence in their home countries. Legal 
practitioners and policy leaders can and must advance solutions that give families fleeing violence the 
opportunity to be fully heard in their immigration court hearings, while also addressing the backlog of 
cases that plague the overworked system. Families’ lives and futures are not, and should not be 
treated like, political footballs. Everyone deserves the opportunity to be heard, especially when their 
life may be at stake. The acceleration of families’ cases fails to answer the larger, structural problems 
of the immigration court system and violates the rights of families to a full and fair hearing. The 
Trump Administration should rescind the FAMU Memo, and future administrations should never 
again use the tactic of acceleration as a bandage for the failure to address structural flaws. 
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